Transformative Effects on Basic SOC Processes

IMPETUS tools support, but also changes the conditions for the basic SOC work processes. Transformative effects are expected to materialize through experience and practical use, but some possible effects are possible to anticipate. For instance:   

• CCTV-based surveillance creates a major (in practical terms unmanageable) attention problem where operators can only select a limited number of screens to monitor dozens or hundreds of cameras throughout the location of interest. As a result, CCTV-based surveillance can rarely allow detection in real-time and is most useful as a close to real-time or even forensics tool.

• Tools Main Functions of (IMPETUS) Tools like the FD have the potential to bring urban surveillance activity in (near) real-time for specific detectable events (e.g., presence of guns). This changes the nature of surveillance and role of the SOC in the direct management of these events.

• Tools like SMD or CTI raise similar issues of attentiveness related to intelligence operations: the increasing plethora of information to be considered makes it impossible to cover everything manually. This changes the nature of what it means to do intelligence analysis. However, it does not remove the analytical part the intelligence operators are responsible for.

• UAD can give early indications but also potentially let the operator track the consequences of response triggered by other tools, and cascading consequences

• BD as an entirely new capability affects both detection and response; e.g., in the case that it gives an alert during an evacuation

• EO can be used to plan for different alternatives, and thus enable a more adapted and dynamic evacuation that responds to new information, for instance from UAD, during evacuation.

• CTDR propose countermeasures based on detection, while WMS monitoring might impact the actual capability to act, e.g. by recommending changed tasking of operators

A common platform (e.g., IMPETUS) allows for exchanges of information between security actors who currently do not have ways to coordinate directly, for instance between intelligence actors and SOC operators. This capability has the potential to support a shift towards a more unified response to events, emancipating from siloed handling of urban security.

Similarly, transfers of data are available by simple “clicks”, allowing for instance field operators and SOC to exchange images rapidly and purposefully.

The changes in information pathways and utilisation from using the platform inside one single actor (e.g., a SOC) creates the opportunity and ability to synthesise types of information that previously were not neither conceivable nor available. This will affect both operations, and the operators' competence.